The Cost-Plus Calculus: Structuring R&D Contracts to Fund the Moonshot
- Jordan Clayton

- Apr 27, 2025
- 4 min read

For a deep-tech founder, the Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP) contract is a lethal instrument. Committing to a fixed price to invent a quantum sensor or develop a novel AI algorithm essentially forces a company to underwrite the laws of physics. A single unknown variable in the R&D process can trigger a cost overrun that threatens solvency.
This structural risk is why the Department of Defense (DoD) utilizes the Cost-Reimbursement (Cost-Plus) contract family. Governed by FAR Subpart 16.3, this vehicle is the primary mechanism for funding high-risk, uncertain R&D. It functions as a strategic "safe harbor," designed to buy down technical risk by shifting the financial burden from the contractor to the government.
In its simplest form, the agreement is straightforward: "The government will pay for 100% of allowable costs. In exchange for the effort, the contractor receives a negotiated fee (profit)." While this arrangement mitigates financial downside, it introduces a significant compliance burden. The price of this "safe harbor" is the requirement to open the firm's financials to the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA).
The Architecture of the Cost-Plus Family
A "Cost-Plus" contract is not a monolithic entity; it is a family of vehicles that share a common reimbursement structure but differ in how profit is calculated. Understanding this nuance is the first step in capture strategy.
1. Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF)
The Deal: The contractor is reimbursed for all allowable costs plus a single, fixed-dollar fee negotiated at inception.
The Dynamic: The fee remains static, regardless of whether final costs exceed or fall below estimates. This provides zero incentive for efficiency but guarantees a predictable profit margin. This vehicle is the workhorse for pure, high-risk R&D where the outcome is uncertain and the level of effort is the only measurable variable.
2. Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee (CPIF)
The Deal: A shared risk/reward model. The contractor is reimbursed for costs plus a fee that fluctuates based on a pre-negotiated "share line" (e.g., an 80/20 split) against a target cost.
The Dynamic: Underrunning the target cost yields a bonus (a share of the savings). Overrunning reduces the fee. This is the government's preferred model for development contracts because it aligns financial incentives: both parties benefit from cost control.
3. Cost-Plus-Award-Fee (CPAF)
The Deal: The "report card" model. The fee is determined subjectively by the government based on performance criteria.
The Dynamic: The contract includes a base fee and an award fee pool. At set intervals, the government grades performance on criteria such as responsiveness and technical collaboration. This grade determines the percentage of the award fee earned.
The Strategic Value: Fueling the Innovation Engine
For a firm with a mature commercial product, a Cost-Plus contract is often suboptimal—high overhead for low, fixed margins. However, for a deep-tech or dual-use company in the R&D phase, this vehicle is a lifeline.
1. De-Risking the Moonshot This is the only logical mechanism to fund projects where the primary output is knowledge or a first-generation prototype (TRL 1-4). It allows the firm to focus entirely on the technical challenge without the pressure of fixed-price constraints.
2. Stabilizing Cash Flow Unlike FFP contracts, which often pay upon milestone delivery, Cost-Plus contracts typically allow for bi-weekly or monthly invoicing of incurred costs. This provides a steady, predictable cash flow essential for sustaining engineering talent during development.
3. The RDT&E Alignment This contract type is the native language of the RDT&E (Research, Development, Test & Evaluation) appropriation. This 2-year money funds DARPA, the Service Labs (AFRL, ONR, ARL), and most SBIR/OTA prototypes. Aligning with Cost-Plus structures positions a firm to capture these specific funding streams.
The Price of Admission: The DCAA Gauntlet
The most significant barrier to entry for Cost-Plus contracts is the requirement for a DCAA-compliant accounting system. This is a non-negotiable, pre-award hurdle.
To be "DCAA-ready," a system must provably:
Segregate Costs: Separate Direct Costs from Indirect Costs (Fringe, Overhead, G&A) and Unallowable Costs (e.g., lobbying).
Enforce Timekeeping: Implement daily, rigorous time tracking by project charge code.
Ensure Auditability: Produce specific reports to verify indirect rates and incurred costs.
Winning a Cost-Plus contract triggers a Pre-Award Survey (SF-1408), a pass/fail audit of the accounting system. Failure results in disqualification.
The Strategic Playbook: Win and Survive
1. Build the Shield Early Do not bid on a Cost-Plus contract without investing in a compliant accounting system (e.g., Unanet, JAMIS). This infrastructure is the cost of entry and should be established 3-6 months prior to a bid.
2. Weaponize Readiness Explicitly state "DCAA-compliant accounting system" in the proposal executive summary. This signals maturity and differentiates the firm as a low-risk partner capable of managing taxpayer funds.
3. Select the Right Vehicle For pure R&D, target CPFF to minimize risk. For prototype development where efficiency is possible, propose CPIF to demonstrate confidence and align incentives with the government.
The Cost-Reimbursement contract is the foundational tool for the DoD's most ambitious R&D. It represents a strategic trade-off: profit potential for financial safety. Mastering the DCAA requirements transforms this vehicle from a barrier into a competitive advantage, positioning the firm as a trusted partner for high-stakes innovation. At DualSight, we provide the Acquisition Vector Strategy to determine if Cost-Plus is the right path and the Operational Integration Analysis to ensure your back office can survive the audit.


